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am pleased to be in Denver and I appreciate 
the  opportunity  to  talk  with  you  about 
current  economic  and  financial  market 
developments. As you know, the past several 
months have been a very difficult period for 
the U.S. economy. A sharp slowdown in growth has 
put the economy at the brink of a recession while, at 
the same time, rising commodity prices have caused 
inflation pressures to rise considerably. And, to make 
matters worse, these events have occurred against 
the backdrop of a collapse in housing markets that 
has shaken financial markets around the world.
The  Federal  Reserve  has  responded  to 
these  developments  aggressively.  It  has  taken 
unprecedented actions to provide increased liquidity 
to banks and other financial market participants to 
maintain the functioning of financial markets. And, 
it has eased monetary policy considerably to try to 
ensure that the disruptions in financial markets do 
not spread to the broader economy.
Despite current difficulties, in my view there 
is room for optimism about the near-term outlook 
for the U.S. economy. Financial markets appear to 
have stabilized somewhat, and the economy should 
pick  up  in  the  second  half  of  the  year  as  fiscal 
and monetary stimuli takes hold. The damage to 
financial markets is severe, however, and it is likely 
to be some time before they are able to function 
normally. Indeed, I believe that major changes in 
industry  practices  and  a  significant  rethinking  of 
financial  regulation  will  be  required  if  we  are  to 
avoid similar problems in the future.
Market turmoil
Let  me  provide  a  more  detailed  discussion 
of  the  disruptions  in  financial  markets  that  have 
occurred  over  the  past  several  months  and  the 
Federal Reserve’s response to 
these events. It is a simple fact 
of history that, over a business 
cycle,  markets  tend  toward 
excess optimism in which risk 
is  seriously  underestimated. 
In some cases, public policy 
is  required  to  “bail  out” 
undeserving  parties  so  as  to 
minimize the broader impact 
on the economy. It is also a 
fact that no matter the source 
of the financial problem, no 
matter the size of the institution or the region in 
which  the  problem  emerges,  the  Federal  Reserve 
will be part of any solution that is developed. This 
was the case in the ’70s, ’80s and ’90s during the 
foreign  debt,  farm,  real  estate  and  energy  crises, 
and is the case today. As a necessary principal party 
in prudential supervision and as the lender of last 
resort,  the  Federal  Reserve  is  best  positioned  for   
this task.
Most in this room are by now well aware of the 
role that subprime lending played in the creation 
of the housing bubble and its collapse. However, 
the  problems  in  the  financial  system  are  much 
broader and deeper than subprime lending. Over 
the past several years, we have seen the emergence 
of  easy  credit  availability,  new  complex  financial 
instruments and reduced credit standards by many 
financial  institutions.  This  left  the  U.S.  financial 
system  dangerously  exposed  to  an  economic  or 
financial shock that could cause widespread defaults 
and  erosion  of  asset  values.  Rising  subprime 
delinquencies provided the spark that started the 
financial conflagration, but there was a lot of dry 
tinder to spread the fire and an absence of firewalls 
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In recent years, subprime mortgages, like other 
mortgages,  have  been  packaged  into  mortgage-
backed securities, and these securities then served as 
collateral for more complex asset-backed securities. 
When  subprime  delinquencies  rose  unexpectedly 
last  summer,  investors  in  many  types  of  asset-
backed securities fled these markets, causing severe 
valuation declines and losses to the holders of these 
securities.  Although  banks  did  not  make  many 
of  the  original  subprime  loans,  they  held  many 
of the affected securities and made loans to other 
institutions that created and held these securities. 
What resulted was a tremendous liquidity squeeze 
for the banking system and financial markets as well 
as large losses as the value of mortgage and other 
asset-backed securities declined. These strains were 
felt not only in the United States but also in Europe, 
Canada, and some other countries where banks and 
other financial institutions had also invested in U.S. 
mortgage and asset-backed securities.
To  meet  panic  demands  for  liquidity,  the 
Federal Reserve and central banks in a number of 
other countries have taken extraordinary steps to 
maintain the functioning of the financial system. In 
the United States the Federal Reserve has made funds 
available to banks and other depository institutions 
through its discount window and has lowered the 
cost of these funds. It has created a new discount 
window  program,  the  Term  Auction  Facility,  to 
provide additional funds to depository institutions 
at a market-determined rate.
The  Federal  Reserve  also  has  taken  a  series 
of  unprecedented  actions  to  provide  support  to 
financial markets more generally. For example, it 
has broadened the range of collateral in its open 
market  operations  and  security  lending  program. 
More recently, it has created a new discount window 
facility  for  the  banks  and  investment  banks  that 
operate as primary dealers. These institutions play a 
key role in the Treasury securities market, and their 
health is important for the Federal Reserve’s ability 
to conduct monetary policy through open market 
operations  and  for  Treasury  debt  management 
operations. And, the Federal Reserve recently chose 
to provide direct support to Bear Stearns, a primary 
dealer, to facilitate its purchase.
As I indicated earlier, financial markets have 
stabilized recently, in part because of the Federal 
Reserve’s timely actions. However, many of these 
actions were short-term in nature, and it is important 
that  more  permanent  approaches  be  developed 
so that a similar crisis does not happen again. In 
my remaining time, I will discuss the longer-term 
approaches necessary to restoring and maintaining 
financial stability.
Steps toward financial and  
regulatory reform
The  current  financial  crisis  has  revealed 
weaknesses  both  in  the  private  mechanisms  that 
financial  markets  employ  to  provide  internal 
discipline and in our system of financial regulation 
and  oversight.  From  the  standpoint  of  private 
market discipline, this crisis has provided the first 
major  test  of  securitization,  complex  financial 
instruments,  risk  modeling,  and  our  new  and 
broader  market  structure.  Recent  events  indicate 
dismal test results: Many financial institutions and 
investors did not adequately judge, price or control 
the risks they assumed and did not prepare well for 
changing financial conditions. All of this occurred 
despite the wide array of new financial instruments 
for hedging risks and the substantial advances many 
market participants claimed to have made in their 
risk management processes.
From a regulatory perspective, existing policies 
and supervisory oversight came up short in several 
areas, most notably in identifying and addressing 
the exposures institutions had in certain off-balance-
sheet activities and in their mortgage lending and 
securitization activities. These exposures, along with 
shortcomings  in  bank  risk  management  systems, 
led to inadequate capital and liquidity levels and to 
inaccurate disclosures of risk positions to investors. 
Other complaints about the regulatory framework 
have included its failure to prevent fraudulent and 
abusive  practices  in  some  areas  of  the  subprime 
market.
One  other  important  regulatory  concern  is 
that  many  of  the  steps  public  authorities  have 
taken  over  the  last  year  to  stabilize  the  financial 
system seem likely to weaken market discipline and 
extend  moral  hazard  problems  to  a  much  wider 
financial marketplace. A key example of this, the 
recent sale of Bear Stearns, seems to indicate that 
in a crisis situation, public authorities will not be 
in a position to let market discipline play out when 
larger  financial  institutions  encounter  problems. 
Bear Stearns’ collapse indicates that such phrases as 
“systemically important” and “too-big-to-fail” can 
even be applied to investment banks below the top 
tier.
The danger from a public policy perspective 
is  that  a  much  broader  group  of  managers  and 
creditors may now believe and act as if they have 
an added layer of protection from the risks they 
pursue.  Beyond  “too-big-to-fail”  concerns,  other 
market  discipline  and  moral  hazard  problems 
may be inherent in some of the recent and more 
expansive proposals to support housing markets and 
in the actions the Federal Reserve had to take to 
provide liquidity to the market and expand discount 
window access.
All of these questions about our financial system 
are eliciting many suggestions for reform. Some have 
suggested that we should turn back the clock when it 
comes to our efforts to deregulate financial markets, 
and others are suggesting significant changes in the 
regulatory  structure.  However,  I  believe  a  more 
fundamental issue is at the heart of our problems 
and should remain the focus of our efforts: How can 
we strike an appropriate balance between risk and 
return in our financial marketplace, while developing 
the  public  policy  steps  necessary  to  support  this 
framework and promote financial stability?
In  a  longer-run  context,  we  have  two  basic 
means  by  which  to  strengthen  and  reform  our 
financial  system:  promote  more  effective  market 
discipline and implement an improved and more 
countercyclical regulatory framework.
Steps toward more effective 
market discipline
For our financial markets to work well, market 
participants must serve as a strong disciplinary force 
in  rewarding  successful  ventures  and  curtailing 
funding  for  nonviable  projects  and  investments. 
However,  as  shown  by  the  current  crisis,  market 
discipline  failed  to  prevent  an  overexpansion  in 
the  markets  for  mortgage  finance  and  allowed  a 
significant mispricing of the underlying risks.
Some of the factors that contributed to this 
market  breakdown  include  the  emergence  of 
extremely complex and hard-to-understand financial 
instruments; shortcomings in regulatory oversight 
and poor disclosures; financial conflicts of interest; 
and  shortcomings  in  corporate  governance.  For 
instance, evaluating the more complex mortgage-
backed securities and collateralized debt obligations 
taxed the abilities of most investors. These investors 
were then left to rely on the credit assessments of 
loan originators, rating agencies, traders, and the 
managers of hedge funds and other investor vehicles, 
most of whom had competing financial incentives. 
Of course, the perennial factor in boom-and-bust 
cycles—greed-induced  myopia—also  played  a 
central role as many market participants assumed 
that  we  could  not  have  a  nationwide  decline  in 
housing prices and that a continuous flow of funds 
would be available.
What steps should market participants take to 
restore their disciplinary role in the financial system 
and prevent the depth of problems we have recently 
experienced? In the near term, investors can be ex-
pected to show a preference for simpler and more 
readily  understood  financial  instruments,  while 
showing a reluctance to put their money in the types 
of markets and investment vehicles that have caused 
much of the recent turmoil. They can also be expect-
ed to exert more “due diligence” and to favor the 
originators, rating agencies and fund managers that 
demonstrate a reputation for providing sound credit 
analysis and accurate disclosures. These are certainly 
some of the most apparent “lessons to be learned,” 
and it will take some time for our financial markets 
to regain the confidence of investors and meet this 
revised set of expectations.
Experience tells us, however, that as time passes 
and memories fade, market participants will always 
be tempted to relax their ongoing disciplinary role, 
particularly as any corrective steps begin to appear 
outmoded in a more prosperous time and as new 
and  seemingly  more  profitable  opportunities  and 
investment  vehicles  are  developed.  For  market 
discipline to be most effective over an entire cycle, it 
will thus be important for investors and institutions 
to  work  to  establish  a  more  resilient  financial 
framework.
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developing risk management processes and models 
that reflect a full range of economic experiences. 
Other needed reforms include establishing stronger 
corporate governance steps—including a better set of 
incentives for financial agents to reduce the conflicts 
of  interest  they  now  face—and  fostering  better 
control  of  liquidity  risk,  clearing  and  settlement 
risks, and counterparty risk.
A stronger, more countercyclical 
regulatory framework
Weaknesses in our regulatory system revealed 
by the current financial crisis also require careful 
thought and action. This crisis, in fact, is raising 
questions  about  such  traditional  supervisory 
issues as bank liquidity analysis, capital standards, 
risk  management  practices  and  off-balance-sheet 
exposures.  Because  many  financial  activities  are 
gravitating  beyond  the  banking  system  and  into 
less-regulated capital markets, questions about the 
scope of regulation and how it can best support 
market discipline must be addressed.
One  area  where  a  number  of  large  banking 
organizations and securities firms have fallen short 
is  in  the  amount  of  capital  they  were  holding 
against their risk exposures. It is clear that many 
organizations  underestimated  such  risks  and, 
accordingly,  the  amount  of  capital  they  would 
need. This was particularly true for a number of 
new  off-balance-sheet  activities  of  larger  banking 
organizations.  With  the  transition  to  Basel  II 
international capital standards for large banks and 
the reliance this system will place on banks’ internal 
risk  models,  it  is  particularly  important  that  we 
make  sure  this  approach  addresses  the  type  of 
problems recently encountered.
In this regard, I have a number of concerns and 
believe we need to be cautious as we implement the 
new standards. First, banks have had a fairly short 
history with their risk models and much of the data 
going  into  these  models  reflects  only  the  period 
of  prosperity  before  recent  events.  In  fact,  tests 
run on these models over the past few years have 
suggested that most large banks could safely reduce 
the amount of capital they hold—a premise which 
has now been shown to be overly optimistic. In 
addition, recent capital problems for larger banking 
associations were tied, in part, to their off-balance-
sheet operations, and it is not clear whether Basel II 
will address these practices, as well as future banking 
innovations, any better than Basel I.
A final concern is that Basel II has the potential 
to be procyclical as bankers update their risk models 
to  reflect  new  events.  Consequently,  if  we  want 
banks to have the capital to withstand future crises, 
I believe it is important for our capital standards 
to incorporate a longer-term view of risk and for 
banks to maintain a base of capital or a leverage 
ratio sufficient to support all their operations. A 
countercyclical,  rules-based  approach  to  control 
leverage is needed. It must be simple and observable 
and, thereby, enforceable.
Liquidity has been another problem for many 
institutions,  particularly  with  breakdowns  in  the 
commercial  paper  and  other  funding  markets, 
difficulties  in  valuing  asset-backed  securities  and 
other  investment  vehicles,  maturity  mismatch 
problems,  and  questions  about  the  financial 
condition  of  some  institutions.  As  I  mentioned 
previously, the Federal Reserve has taken a number 
of new approaches through the discount window 
to address these liquidity issues. We will certainly 
reevaluate these steps in the near future and decide 
what worked and whether such innovations as the 
liquidity facility should be continued.
We will also have to take a careful look at the 
moral hazard issues that might have been created 
by the expansion in discount window access and 
consider what we can do to change such perceptions. 
Other  suggestions  for  reforming  the  discount 
window have also been made, such as converting 
some of the lending to a “line of credit” format, 
under which institutions could pay a fee for standby 
access to the window. It is also of critical importance 
for  banking  and  other  financial  supervisors  to 
review and strengthen their policies on liquidity; 
otherwise we will face many of the same problems 
in the future.
Because many of our current financial problems 
can be tied to asset-backed securities, beginning with 
the subprime market, we should ask ourselves what 
can be done to strengthen the regulatory framework 
surrounding  securitization  and  to  address  the 
asymmetric information problems in this market. 
This is a particularly important question given the 
benefits that securitization can bring to our credit 
markets in terms of attracting new funding sources 
and distributing risk across a broader marketplace.
Among  the  ideas  now  being  suggested  are: 
(1)  tighter  registration  requirements  for  loan 
originators; (2) improved disclosures by originators 
and  securitizers  on  the  underlying  loans;  (3) 
new limits on the types of asset-backed securities 
regulated institutions can hold; (4) greater liability, 
risk exposure or equity positions for originators and 
securitizers; and (5) new regulations for the agencies 
rating these securities.
Other  regulatory  steps  may  be  necessary. 
For  example,  some  have  questioned  whether 
the  regulatory  framework  has  kept  up  with  the 
movement of securities firms into a broader range 
of activities. Where such firms once concentrated 
on brokerage and underwriting activities, the recent 
market collapse has shown that the most significant 
risks securities firms face are now in other areas. In 
regard to subprime lending regulation, the Federal 
Reserve has proposed a number of regulatory changes 
under Regulation Z and the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act to provide greater protection 
to  consumers  and  to  eliminate  certain  deceptive 
or  abusive  practices  on  higher-priced  mortgage 
loans.  These  amendments  would  also  extend 
other protections to all mortgage loans, including 
additional disclosures when lenders advertise loan 
rates and features.
A final and very important regulatory issue is 
what we do with firms that might be considered 
“too-big-to-fail.” With a growing number of large 
firms  linked  to  each  other  through  clearing  and 
settlement systems, capital markets activities, and 
counterparty risks, it is becoming more difficult to 
avoid supporting such entities during crisis periods. 
In fact, we are rapidly creating an environment in 
which the investors, creditors and managers at such 
institutions take it for granted that they will have 
this added measure of protection when taking risk.
There are no easy answers in dealing with this 
“too-big-to-fail” issue, but we need to take some 
strong steps if we are to restore the proper balance 
between financial risk and return and make market 
discipline  effective.  But  we  must  be  certain  that 
whenever a bailout cannot be avoided, it should 
follow that public authorities assume senior positions 
with respect to stockholders and other creditors at 
these “too-big-to-fail” institutions.
Conclusion
The  Federal  Reserve,  as  the  nation’s  central 
bank,  has  responsibility  and  accountability  for 
overall financial stability. It has been given the tools 
of  authority  in  monetary  policy,  and  regulatory 
and payments system oversight in a decentralized 
structure  insulated  from  politics  to  achieve  its 
mission.  Doing  what  must  be  done  to  facilitate 
financial stability has always been the independent 
Federal Reserve System’s role. It will be difficult. 
One  has  to  look  no  further  than  recent  news 
media  headlines  about  the  strong  opposition  to 
the proposed regulatory changes in the mortgage 
industry that I just mentioned to know this is true. 
But this environment is not much different today 
than at the Federal Reserve’s founding. Thus, as we 
take on these new challenges, I’ll leave you with this 
quote from 1930 to illustrate my point. It is from 
Paul Warburg, who was appointed a member of the 
first Federal Reserve Board by President Woodrow 
Wilson:
“In  a  country  whose  idol  is  prosperity,  any 
attempt to tamper with conditions in which easy 
profits are made and people are happy, is strongly 
resented. It is a desperately unpopular undertaking 
to dare to sound a discordant note of warning in an 
atmosphere of cheer, even though one might be able 
to forecast with certainty that the ice, on which the 
mad dance was going on, was bound to break. Even 
if  one  succeeded  in  driving  the  frolicking  crowd 
ashore before the ice cracked, there would have been 
protests that the cover was strong enough and that 
no disaster would have occurred if only the situation 
had been left alone.”
There  are  many  challenges  ahead,  many 
choices to make. Some I suspect will be desperately 
unpopular.
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